The stream continues to evolve in the coverage of the interaction between law, technology and cyberspace and these papers continue this tradition. Every year, it seems, the boundaries of discussion about law's interaction with technology is being pushed far beyond what many of us would have dared to imagine even a decade ago. To some extent this lies in the nature of the subject matterthe pace of change in technology is something with which we are all familiar and this clearly drives much of the need for the law to respond and re-frame itself. However, the other side of the discussion is due to the commitment and energy of the socio-legal scholars that populate the stream. Every year I feel privileged to participate in the stream and play my role as co-convenor. My Google calendar reminder is eagerly poised as the next SLSA conference approaches!
Technology and future law
In this issue I have selected four articles that reflect much of the sentiment in the previous paragraph. In each article the authors contemplate how our futures are being re-shaped by technology and how the law should make sense of it. They are all fitting contributions to the impressive body of work that has preceded them in earlier special issues of this journal that have come from our stream at this conference.
In 'Jordan's Dilemma: Can Large Parties Still Be Intimate? Redefining Public, Private and the Misuse of the Digital Person' Marion Oswald discusses the way in which digital technology is recasting the meaning of both public and private life through a discussion of what it means to be 'private in public' and what having 'a reasonable expectation of privacy' actually means in a digital world where almost everyone is watching and recording everyone else (or at least is potentially doing so). In effect, once our information is online and revealed, does this mean that there are no limits to where it can legitimately and lawfully go? As Oswald discusses, the technology that facilitates our online presence also carries within it the ability to find and track our cyber presence (and for that matter our real world existence too). While we may see our online chats as personal and contained to the direct recipients (a sense facilitated no doubt by the manner in which we type into a computer in a physically contained and often lonely physical spacecyber activity for most of us is a physically sole action that emboldens us to be ourselves and often disclose more than we would in a physically interactive environment), once disseminated we have little control of who ultimately reads them. The shift from apparent anonymity to cyber celebrity or villain can be sudden and jolting. I am also reminded here of the law enforcement agencies' mantra that if you offend online, 'you will be tracked down and prosecuted'. In effect there is no privacy in cyberspace, however, should there be?
As Oswald then explains, traditional notions of public and private no longer assist in our understanding and response to the intrusion of technology into our lives. This is especially so when one's expectation of privacy in the digital world comes up against what others see as in the public domain and so within their right to free expression to disseminate further. She then reviews various possible ways of addressing the issue of personal privacy online, through current case law and technological responses that might act to block or limit such intrusion into privacy. In the end Oswald argues for an alternative model that focuses more on inappropriate misuse of private information, a tort that places an obligation on others that come into the information, rather than focussing on the harm being caused. Importantly, such an approach is not driven by the technology that in a practical way makes information accessible. Instead it looks to the nature of the information, and asks essentially whether it is the sort of information that shouldin spite of it being onlinebe regarded nevertheless as being of a nature that should be seen as fair game to disseminate further. While this may ultimately rely on adherence through individuals accepting the moral persuasiveness of such law, this in itself is not a foreign notion when it comes to acting in accordance with the law. In this way Oswald also reminds us that the content of law is based on a moral and ethical stance. Digital technology has to some extent hidden that notion of law on the basis that the 'practical' use of that technology is overwhelming in terms of our options. This article reminds us that law must not only facilitate the use of new technologies, it should also shape how they are used.
The second article turns to a phenomenon that is moving at a rapid pace and is likely to transform our cities and our mobility as well as the law. In 'Privacy Implications and Liability Issues of Autonomous Vehicles' Lisa Collingwood examines various aspects of the development of what are often termed 'driverless vehicles'. Noting that such vehicles have many positive attributes she argues that we also have to be aware of the privacy and liability concerns attached to their use. Quite simply, the logging of journeys which driverless vehicles depend on to locate routes, passengers and time on the road, also means that the anonymous journey will be a thing of the past. While security services may consider that a good outcome, the reality is that our intimate lives are being recast by technology that is not apparently created with that in mind. As Collingwood argues, the secret romantic rendezvous will be either lost forever, or take place under the gaze of this potentially ubiquitous technology.
The other legal problem created by the driverless car is the matter of liability when accidents do occur. At a simple level, if there is no driver then who should be held liable for such accidents? Are the occupants of the car responsible? Or is it the manufacturer of the software that guides the vehicle? As Collingwood points out the attraction of driverless vehicles is that the occupants can be doing other things such as reading or sleeping, so they are hardly in the position to take control of the vehicle, or at least they will be unlikely to realise the need to intervene until it is too late. And in any case, could an occupant override the artificial intelligence that is driving the vehicle in practice? What is argued in the paper is that such technology has the potential to make redundant much of the law that currently deals with driving. Instead, hard decisions will have to be made as to where liability should fall in such cases. This seems to raise the question of whether we are looking at a legal 'black hole' or whether we are on the cusp of new legal principles to apportion responsibilitya veritable Donoghue v Stevenson 2.0 perhaps! Who in law is my neighbourperhaps a robot car? When one adds in, as Collingwood points out, the possibility of cyberattacks on the software that guides such vehicles, the need for clarity in the law is even more obvious. The dilemma for the law is that to do nothing could in itself either stifle the development of a technology with many benefits, or seriously expose those same individuals to massive legal claims.
Magnus Eriksson also addresses the driverless vehicle in 'The Normativity of Automated Driving: A Case Study of Embedding Norms in Technology'. Eriksson however, tackles the issue through a discussion of not only the regulation of the technology but how the technology itself also regulates urban space. Central to this discussion is how automated driving embeds legal norms in technology. Eriksson engages with these issues through a case study of the DriveMe project in Gothenburg, Sweden which is a study of the use of automated driving on ordinary roads in the area. What is of interest, according to Eriksson, is the manner in which the engineering of the programming of automated vehicles not only creates an ideal type of driving that is safe, efficient and convenient, but is also a style of driving that is quite different to that of humans. In this sense the technology is embedding its own norms that must balance between various factors to ensure a safe and efficient ride while also minimising the need for human intervention.
This notion that the technology can embed norms as one aspect of regulation does have limitations. Eriksson points out that the technology itself can only go so far in embedding legal or other norms. The mere fact that driving itself exists in an human environment that is unpredictable means that the codes written for the software cannot predict all possibilities that may be encountered on the roads and so have to generalise to some extent. 'The way the traffic situation unfolds determines how the autonomous vehicle behaves, rather than the other way around' is how Eriksson puts it. I find this a fascinating insight. We are often concerned about how technology appears to determine our existence and that technology may come to control us rather than liberate us. However, are we now seeing with the advent of more intelligent systems the possibility that as they interact with the human environment it is actually humans that control and constrain technology, provided humans continue to be random, unpredictable and imaginative in their actions?
The final paper seeks to explain recent developments within the Chinese legal system with respect to the use of digital technology. In 'Chinese Judicial Justice on the Cloud: a Future Call or a Pandora's Box?' Alison Xu examines the utilisation of online and digital technology to provide a more open form of justice in China. In doing so, Xu both highlights how the use of such technology in the judicial system connects with an economy that is undergoing rapid development in recent times through providing accessible and efficient dispute resolution. While usage of the internet is far from universal in China, it seems that the pilot schemes described in this article are allowing China to develop online judicial systems that are developing along with an increased access to the online world by citizens.
However, there are nevertheless less welcome aspects of these developments. The article asks a number of questions around the manner in which commercial interests appear to be too close to the construction of the online court systems and the manner in which the collection of data by the court process within this system may benefit those commercial interests if they are given access to that data. Xu describes this as the outsourcing of some parts of the judicial services that again raises the theme of how the use of technology itself shapes the nature of law and the legal process. As she notes, the boundaries in such uses of technology do have to be made clearer.
Legal imaginations and the shaping of technology
While the articles in this collection respond to issues raised by their specific subject matter, an emerging theme is that the role of law in determining the boundaries of the use of technology is becoming more important as that technology is intruding further into our lives. The advent of more sophisticated forms of artificial intelligence is often presented as the beginning of the end of human control of society, however, perhaps this will depend on whether we permit this to happen as a legal matter. Certainly, a large part of the narrative of law and technology has been about law's need to 'catch up' with technology, presumably to allow such technology to be developed and enter the marketplace. Yet, the penetration of technology into our personal liveswhether as we see in this issue through, for example, the further dissemination of 'private' discussions, or the logging of romantic meetings in automated vehiclesmay have simply added to the counter narrative that law can be a bulwark against unreasonable applications of technology in our lives.
Richard Susskind and Daniel Susskind suggest that while in some walks of life we may choose human made artefacts over robot constructions, in the case of the professions, including the law, the cost effectiveness and quality of a machine produced service relegates as they say 'the old ways of working' to the past. 1 While algorithms do speed up the scanning of documents and professional literature, the application of discretion that features in many areas of law may not be so ready made for programming into robot lawyers. It is to the role of imagination and the application of values and how we might escalate those skills for the next generation of lawyers that we may have to turn to in order to preserve the humanity of professions. Often such features of the legal system are presented as an area more to do with emotion than hard data. 2 But the application of value-based discretion has long had a role in the law, and while it is now often criticised by populists as little more than personal bias, such professional judgments are a cornerstone of a democratic legal system. There is a role to enhance and improve this area of the law, but that is not the same thing as assuming a machine can do it better. Thus the automation of the law is a choice and not an inevitable consequence of new technology. This is a central theme that emerges from the articles in this special issue. In one sense the technology written about here has no conscience. Automated vehicles obey the road rules because they are programmed to do so, stored personal information does not characterise itself. It is the law that may stand between this neutral technology and its use in ways that offend human values about fairness, reasonableness or justice. As the articles here demonstrate, human environments are unpredictable, random and not always rational. Such traits make for difficulty in writing programmes that harness digital technology, yet in saying that the same traits may become a bulwark against the inevitable application of technologies that could control our lives in unexpected ways. The role of law is apparent in these articles. It is to the law we turn to construct limitations and controls on how technology should be used in our lives. Sometimes these legal norms may be embedded in the technology itself, although at other times it may be that the law simply refuses to permit the use of technology for certain purposes. The point is that law is not simply the product of the technological impulses in society, but is essentially a human construct. What we need to ensure is that those who come to law find people with imagination, values and a certain randomness in approach that can be harnessed to frame the technology as much as the other way around. To paraphrase Lewis Carroll, who is to be the master, law or technology? 3 I thank the authors, presenters and participants in the Information Technology Law and Cyberspace stream and in the sub-theme of Law, Trust and Emerging Technologies of the Socio-Legal Studies Association Annual Conferences at Lancaster University in 2016. Without them the stream and this special issue would not exist. I also thank Mark O'Brien the stream
